But what would it mean if Jesus's death had no legal status? If Jesus had not been condemned to the "ultimate punishment" by a Roman prefect but merely killed hors la loi with the prefect's connivance? According to Dante, at least, the theological signicance of this irregularity would be catastrophic. He reasons that if "Adam's sin was not punished in Christ"-that is, by a penalty exacted after a solemnly concluded Roman trial-all of humankind "would still be 'the children of wrath. '" 23 And what would it mean for us still, if Jesus's trial had reached no formal conclusion? That is to say, if-as Agamben claims-the trial of Jesus is, "in a certain way . . . always under way"? 24 These questions, posed by Agamben, are genuinely interesting. His use of sources in posing and resolving them, however, is at times high-handed, and at others-to all appearances-underhanded. Since Agamben takes "attention to documents" as a methodological ground rule; professes to "follow the laws of historical philology"; 25 Agamben's legal-philosophical writings have seen a decade or so of intensely politicized and often exotic appropriation. They have occasionally been the object of polemics. Yet they have least frequently met with rigorous criticism on their own terms. It is, thus, precisely a philological critique of the philological arguments made in Pilate and Jesus that I offer in this article. The result is a demonstration that Pilate did sentence Jesus to death on a Roman cross.
the structure of agamben's text
On the surface, Agamben's text has no structure-apart from its division into nineteen numbered (but untitled) sections, and seven unnumbered (and untitled) sections. The seven unnumbered sections of the text are best treated as their rubric suggests: they are Agamben's "glosses." The reader can use them to clarify or amplify the meaning of his core, numbered sections.
But while Agamben's numbered sections carry no titles and exhibit no obvious order, I suggest that they can nevertheless be distributed into ve denite-if not always discrete-groupings: creedal ( § §1-2) apocryphal ( § §3-5) exegetical ( § §6-9, 13-14) theological ( § §10-12) political ( § §15-19) As these groupings do not contribute equally to the interpretive base or argumentive arc of Pilate and Jesus, in my discussion I therefore treat them accordingly.
In Agamben's introductory creedal grouping, I identify a pair of clear implications regarding Pontius Pilate's place in the Creed-neither of which holds up under close inspection. In the apocryphal grouping that follows, we will see that Agamben makes substantial use of only a single passage in a single extra-canonical text-a fourth-century Acts of Pilate-and that this passage contradicts the juridical thesis of Pilate and Jesus.
The question of the irregularity of Jesus's trial only comes to the fore in Agamben's exegetical grouping, but it remains decisive for the remainder of his text. The core section of this grouping is §7, which is also the core section of Pilate and Jesus. This is where Agamben sketches his interpretation of Jesus's Roman trial in seven "scenes," 27 privileging the trial narrative in John's gospel. 28 Yet Agamben's decisive claims are not made in §7. First, in §6, he claims that none of the gospels reports a Roman judgment expressis verbis; and second, in §13, that Pilate "hands over" Jesus without having sentenced him. Both claims set the argumentive arc of Pilate and Jesus, and both prove to be false. With these claims discredited, the theological and political groupings of Pilate and Jesus lose their force.
In a historical excursus, I trace the thesis of Pilate's non-judgment back to the Divine Institutes of Lactantius, a fourth-century Roman courtier; and then outline the refutation of the Lactantian tradition by the celebrated seventeenth-century Dutch legist, Hugo Grotius. It is not without interest to see how the thesis of Pilate and Jesus is dismantled, avant la lettre, by the leading international lawyer of the early modern period.
I conclude with a very brief critique of Agamben's general theory of judgment, as he presents it in Pilate and Jesus.
creedal grouping: the primitive centrality of pontius pilate I once overheard a joke in a Budapest establishment, which I believe is Hungarian, or at least Middle-European: "I made it in like Pilate made it into the Creed." This captures the sense of improbability-or even, on the face of it, impropriety-that Agamben uses to open his text. The only name to appear in the core profession of Christian belief, beside those of Mary and Jesus, is that of a pagan, Roman ofcial-an idolater. 29 Christians are still, to this day, confessing that they believe in Pontius Pilate. 30 Why is this?
Agamben rst points out that Pilate is not named in the creed promulgated by the Council of Nicaea (325 C.E.). 31 It is only with the creed attributed to the Council of Constantinople (381 C.E.) 32 that a conciliar creed represents Jesus as having been "crucied for us under Pontius 35 Agamben then asks: Would it not have been more natural for the Constantinopolitan Creed to state that Jesus was crucied "under Tiberius" (sub Tiberio), much as Dante's Vergil was born "under Julius" (sub Julio)? 36 He then-correctly-suggests that Tiberius would be the more logical reference here, if "the historical character of Jesus' passion" were all that concerned the Council of Constantinople. In support of this, Agamben cites Luke 3:1, 37 where John the Baptist begins to preach "in the fteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar." 38 On the basis of this set of clear implications-Agamben presents them as (α) that Pilate only surfaced in creedal formulas in the year 381, and (β) that Tiberius Caesar would have been the most logical "pagan" to have gured in the creed of 381-Agamben proposes a vague, tentative reason for Pilate's appearance in the Constantinopolitan Creed: "It is possible that over [the Council's] undoubted chronographic intention there prevailed the importance that the gure of Pilate has in the narrative of the Gospels." 39 This conjecture permits Agamben to then aestheticize and psychologize the gure of Pilate in the remainder of §2.
"One can say," Agamben goes on to say, "that Pilate is perhaps the only true 'character' of the Gospels." 40 By this, he means that it is only with Pilate, and over the course of Jesus's trial, that "the evangelists reveal . . . something like the intention to construct a character, with his own psychology and idiosyncrasies." 41 Yet bypassing the theological tradition entirely, a single page of a 1920s Soviet-suppressed novel by Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky serves to discredit this notion. For Jesus is himself, of course, an artfully realized character in the gospels. Krzhizhanovsky, in passing, registers the uncanny effect of Jesus's silences in the gospels. These pauses are so pregnant, and so singular-says Krzhizhanovsky-that one could arrange them to compose a "Gospel according to Silence." 42 
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It is unnecessary to analyze Agamben's literary intuitions, however, for when we turn to preNicene creed-like formulas it immediately becomes evident that the Council of Constantinoplecontra Agamben's (α)-merely formalized Pilate's place in a host of pre-Nicene formulas.
Before even turning to these pre-Nicene formulas, we should note that Luke 3:1 names Pontius Pilate. Now, this is the verse that Agamben cites in support of his notion that Tiberius had a more logical claim than Pilate upon the Creed. 44 Yet this is how Luke introduces the gure of John the Baptist: "in the fteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judaea." In his only reference to Christ, Tacitus uses comparable phrasing. "During the rule of Tiberius," we read in the Annals, Jesus was crucied "by sentence of the procurator Pontius Pilatus." 45 And similarly, Justin Martyr writes that Jesus was "crucied under Pontius Pilate, procurator of Judaea, in the times of Tiberius Caesar." 46 Notwithstanding this common form of dating under the emperors-that is, of dating by emperors' regnal years-Luke 3:1 indicates how Agamben has misconstrued both Pilate's presence and Tiberius's absence in the Constantinopolitan Creed. For Agamben simply assumes that Pilate's name is a chronological index in the Creed, when it is, rather, a jurisdictional index. What Agamben takes to be the Creed's historical line is, instead, a juridical line. 47 Pontius Pilate held the ofce of "prefect of Judaea" ( praefectus Judaeae). 48 For a trial that was held in Judaea circa 30 C.E., 49 a reference to Pilate happens to be chronologically more serviceable than a reference to Tiberius-since Tiberius ruled from 14 to 37, whereas Pilate only held his prefectship from 26 to 36. But this is immaterial. Dates in the rst centuries C.E. were indexed by emperors' regnal years-not by provincial ofcials' careers. The Creed names Pilate because this is institutionally and jurisdictionally more precise than a reference to Tiberius.
The emperor had isolated himself on Capri beginning in the year 25, and Tiberius's debauchery there had resulted-as Suetonius relates-in his near-total neglect of Roman Palestine. 50 By way of contrast, Pilate occupied a heavily fortied palace at Caesarea Maritima on Israel's coastline. He is only ever named-in Christian and non-Christian sources alike 51 -in connection with his tenure as 44 "the highest Roman ofcial in Judea." 52 Whereas Tiberius's jurisdiction never ceased to extend-in Luke's phrase-to "all the world," 53 Pilate's strictly coincided with the imperial province within which Jesus lived and died. Contra Agamben's (β), then, it is perfectly logical for Pontius Pilate to gure in the Constantinopolitan Creed. The name "Pilate" succinctly accounts for the crucixion of Jesus-a Roman punishment 54 -outside the walls of Jerusalem. For this execution, there is no need to reference Tiberius. We nd a subtle conrmation of this in Luke 20:20, where it is only the Roman prefect who matters when the evangelist relates how the high-priestly court in Jerusalem sought to "hand Jesus over to the jurisdiction (archē) and authority (exousia) of the governor." Why would Pilate's appearance in the Creed not be determined by his "jurisdiction and authority" in Roman Judaea? And similarly, in Luke 13:1, 55 when Luke alludes to certain "Galileans whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrices" at Jerusalem, there is no reference to Tiberius. This is because the name "Pilate" sufces to account for the deaths of these Galileans in Jerusalem. 56 And this is why it is primarily Pilate-the prefect of Judaea-who is named in a great number of primitive Christian formulas which recollect Jesus's death. The rst of these is incorporated into the New Testament. At 1 Timothy 6:13, the letter's recipient is charged to keep the faith "in the presence of God, who gives life to all things, and of Christ Jesus, who in his testimony before Pontius Pilate made the good confession." This passage goes unnoticed by Agamben, but in his study of the early Christian creeds, J. N. D. Kelly remarks that the "creed-like character" of this passage "leaps at once to the eye." 57 The apostolic centrality of Jesus's suffering "under Pontius Pilate" is similarly attested by Peter's sermon in Acts 3, where Jesus is "delivered up . . . before the face of Pilate" and then crucied (3:13-15); by the kerygmatic prayer of Peter and John in Acts 4, which begins (much like the Symbolum Apostolicum), "Lord, you are he that made heaven and earth," before reciting how "Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and peoples of Israel" had conspired against the Christ (4:24-30); and nally-still within the canonical Acts-by Paul's sermon in the synagogue at Antioch, where he states that the Judaic "rulers" of Jerusalem had "asked Pilate to have him killed" (13:27-28).
It is doubtless this litany of apostolic references to Pilate that echoes through Ignatius of Antioch's early Greek epistles (ca. 107), where we see that Jesus's passion and resurrection occurred "in the time of the governorship (hēgemonias) of Pontius Pilate," 58 and that Jesus was "truly nailed 52 Ibid., 161. 53 Luke 2:1. Or so the Vulgate, at least, referring to Augustus reads "edictum a Caesare Augusto ut describeretur universus orbis." The Greek reads "pasan ten oikoumenen. apocryphal grouping: "how those who tell the truth are judged"
Pilate does not gure in the Constantinopolitan Creed because he intrigued the bishops of the Council of Constantinople. Still, there is no denying that early Christians were fascinated by Pilate's psychology-or perhaps better, by the question of his "conscience" (conscientia). 68 The reason for this fascination is, arguably, simple.
According to Tacitus's Annals, Jesus was put to death "by sentence of the procurator Pontius Pilatus." 69 70 by the high-priestly court in Jerusalem. 71 Yet according to the canonical gospels, Pilate yielded to the high-priestly indictment, and ordered the crucixion of Jesus, without being persuaded by that indictment. 72 He crucied a man he held to be innocent.
On this point there is no need to harmonize the canonical gospels. In all of the Synoptic accounts, Pilate challenges Jesus's accusers: "What evil has he done?" 73 And in Luke and John alike, he protests that he has found "no cause" to condemn Jesus. 74 The prefect's incredulity is most explicitly stated in Luke 23, where he denies that his investigation has sustained the charges of sedition. "Having examined him," Pilate says, "I nd no cause in this man." 75 This is obviously intended to read as a formal protestation of Jesus's innocence. Nevertheless, shortly after this protest, Luke reports that Pilate "gave sentence" 76 or "gave his verdict," 77 so that it was on the prefect's decree that Jesus was put to death-anked by "bandits" or "rebels" 78 -outside of Jerusalem. This is the tragic interest of Pilate's psychology in the canonical gospels: he declares Jesus to be innocent, but he orders the crucixion. In terms of Aristotle's Poetics, Pilate kills Jesus like Medea kills her children: consciously. 79 The Roman prefect is neither crazed nor deceived. And because of this, the question-however misdirected-can be raised: is Pilate's decision to crucify the Son of God an act of consummate impiety (since Jesus is not only innocent but "the light of the world") 80 or a sign of reluctant piety (since Jesus, nevertheless, "must be lifted up" for the salvation of the world)? 81 It is this uncertainty that inspires a colorful sub-genre of early Christian texts that embellish the Roman prefect's life and afterlife-a convoluted mass of traditions that J. K. Elliott has dubbed a "Pilate cycle." 82 We have surviving variations on what appears to be a fourth-century Christian Acts of Pilate, 83 which may have originally been put into circulation to neutralize a pagan Acts of Pilate that was "published under Emperor Maximin in 311-12 for use against Christians." 84 We have letters purportedly sent from Pilate to the emperors Tiberius 85 and Claudius, and to the tetrarch Herod-and occasionally, letters in reply-all of which were authored by Christians. We even have a ctitious martyrdom of Pilate, in which he is put to death in Rome, but not before Jesus thunders out of the clouds to console his erstwhile judge: "All generations . . . shall call you blessed, because in your governorship everything was fullled which the prophets foretold about me." 86 At the same time, the Pilate cycle celebrates his wife Procla (so named according to tradition), 87 who "suffered many things . . . in a dream" about Jesus and tried to prevent the crucixion of "that just man" (according to Matthew 27) . 88 Agamben tarries for nine pages with this extra-canonical material, in what I take to be the apocryphal grouping of Pilate and Jesus ( § §3-5). He convincingly divides this material into Christianizing and demonizing Pilate legends. According to the Christianizing legend, 89 Pilate is "already a Christian in his own conscience"-the phrase, which Agamben quotes, is Tertullian's (iam pro sua conscientia christianus) 90 -at the time of Jesus's trial. According to the demonizing legend, Pilate is dogged by "malignant and lthy spirits" who spectacularly dele his corpse after he is beheaded (or suicides) 91 in Rome. 92 Since this material is full of "curious imaginings," 93 Agamben's apocryphal grouping makes for lively reading. But in terms of substance, there is only one extra-canonical text that Agamben introduces in this grouping and then returns to in his exegetical grouping. When he introduces this text, he announces that he will return to it. 94 And conveniently, there is only a single passage of this text that he treats as signicant.
The text in question is the recently mentioned fourth-century Christian Acts of Pilate. 95 It is with this Acts that the "true and proper Pilate cycle . . . begins," 96 according to Agamben, and the part of this Acts that intrigues him contains Pilate's "dialogue with Jesus on truth, which in the canonical gospels ends abruptly with Pilate's question" to Jesus, at John 18:38: "What is truth?" In the Acts of Pilate-Agamben promises us in §3-this dialogue rather "continues and acquires a completely 83 Agamben's juridical thesis, which the apocryphal grouping is still preparing, is that Jesus's trial "does not conclude with a judgment." 98 To buttress this thesis, Agamben insists that the Greek terms for judgment are not represented in the canonical trial narratives. He stresses this for the rst time in §6, at the outset of his exegetical grouping. "Judgment in Greek is krisis," we are informed; and then: "In the [trial] narrative of the evangelists the term does not appear." 99 This is inaccurate, as Agamben half-concedes in his rst gloss. 100 The Greek term for judgment is, in fact, represented in the Roman trial narrative of Luke, 101 as it is in the predictions of a Judaic trial in Matthew and Mark 102 and during the preparations for a Judaic trial in John. 103 But what matters for us, here, is simply that Agamben does not want the term judgment to appear in the canonical trial narratives. This is because Agamben's Pilate has not judged, and cannot judge, his Jesus. 104 Pilate, however, expressly judges Jesus in the extra-canonical dialogue that Agamben cites in §3, and then quotes in §7. This is Agamben's report of that dialogue:
[T]he interrogation continues [after Pilate's question, "What is truth?"] with Jesus' reply: "Truth is from heaven," and with Pilate's new question: "Is there not truth upon the earth?" Jesus' response-"You see how those who tell the truth are judged by those who have authority on earth"-concludes the interrogation. 105 Now, Agamben habitually gives the original Greek and Latin in parentheses, following critical or difcult terms in his sources. He decides not to do so here. But when Jesus responds to Pilate for the last time in the preceding exchange, he uses the term for judgment that Agamben denies nding in the canonical gospels. "You see," says Jesus, "how those who tell the truth are judged (krinontai)." 106 We see from this rebuke that Agamben's apocryphal Jesus is judged by his apocryphal Pilate. Moreover, this judgment is formally issued several chapters later in the Acts of Pilate, where-in a paragraph that Agamben prefers not to cite-Pilate says to Jesus, Your nation has convicted (katēlegze) you of being a king. Therefore I have decreed (apephēnamēn) that you should rst be scourged according to the law of the pious [Roman] emperors, and then hanged on the cross in the garden where you were seized. And let Dysmas and Gestas, the two malefactors, be crucied with you 
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Pilate's judgment, here, by no means contains purely canonical material. The names for the "malefactors" crucied with Jesus are extra-canonical (although the term itself, kakourgos, is likely taken over from Luke), 108 and the idea of a crucixion in Gethsemane is agrantly countercanonical. 109 Nevertheless, Pilate's judgment in this passage opens with a paraphrase of John 18:35 ("Your own nation and the chief priests have handed you over to me"), and his punitive decree is compatible with-and very likely, suggested by-the canonical narratives of the trial. This brings us to the exegetical grouping of Pilate and Jesus ( § §6-9, 13-14).
exegetical grouping: the judgments of jesus and pilate
For Agamben, the truth of Jesus's interrogation by Pilate can be distilled into the single word: nonjudgment. Jesus is not judged by Pilate for the obscure reason that "Jesus could not actually be judged"-and this leads Agamben to make the obscurantist deduction that "there can truly be no judgment" until the Last Day. 110 Pilate, in turn, is not judged because Agamben's Jesus practices nothing but a "critique of every judgment." 111 The trial of Jesus is therefore in an absolute sense "a trial without judgment," 112 which is also to say, "a simulacrum of a trial" (un simulacro di processo). 113 We can rapidly establish that the thesis of Jesus's non-judgment is contradicted by a series of texts in John-the gospel that Agamben cites in support of this thesis 114 -such as the following: from a mystical judgment of Pilate-and indeed, of all terrestrial government-by Jesus. For in the gospel of John, at least, 123 Jesus's cross is the place where the prince of this world is invisibly yet irreversibly judged and overcome. In other words, at the site of Jesus's punishment by Pilate (and the Sanhedrin), he accomplishes his judgment of Pilate (and the Sanhedrin).
Still, the supposed non-judgment of Jesus is of only momentary interest to Agamben. 124 In his exegetical grouping ( § §6-9, 13-14), he introduces the juridical thesis that shapes his theological and political groupings ( § §10-12, 15-19) and preoccupies him in the glosses: the non-judgment of Pilate. This is the notion that serves, at once, as the fulcrum and base of Agamben's text: Jesus was crucied after "a trial without any judgment." 125 At the close of the Roman phase of Jesus's trial, Pilate had "not handed down a sentence." 126 Agamben reiterates this claim frequently, and practically verbatim. Refusing to "pronounce a sentence," he writes in §7, Pilate "limits himself to 'handing over' ( paredōken) the accused to the Jews." 127 Pilate "does not give a verdict," he repeats in §13, but "limits himself to 'handing over' Jesus" to be crucied. 128 And again, in his rst gloss: the Roman prefect "did not pronounce his sentence," but "simply 'handed over' the accused to the Sanhedrin and the executioner." 129 This is the place to point out that the juridical thesis of Pilate and Jesus is not original to Agamben. Already in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes could write that "Pilate . . . without nding fault in him, delivered [Christ] to the Jews to bee crucied." 130 The elision of Pilate's judgment, here, signals a negation-and this reading of the trial of Jesus antedates Hobbes by at least 1300 years. There will be more on this subsequently.
Nearer to our purpose here is that the thesis of Pilate's non-judgment has maintained a presence in the critical literature since at least the appearance of Giovanni Rosadi's Il processo di Gesú. 131 Consider the following:
1. "In reality," Rosadi asserts in 1904, "the sentence was not pronounced [by Pilate]; the accused was simply handed over to his accusers." 132 As we have seen, Agamben asserts the same-and in much the same wording-in Pilate and Jesus. 2. In a still indispensable 1935 essay, "Utilitas Crucis," E. J. Bickerman concedes that "none of the evangelists explicitly mentions the death warrant which Pilate issues. They all write that the procurator, wishing to satisfy the people's demands, 'handed over' Jesus to them, so that he might be crucied." 133 Crucially, however, Bickerman warns that "no one would infer from this that Paul or Justin [Martyr] . . . ever forgot that juridically speaking, Jesus was condemned by the Roman procurator." 134 3. More darkly, a German jurist and Nazi Reichsjustizministerium ofcer, Wilhelm von Ammon, 135 states atly in 1953, "Nowhere in the sources is there talk of a death sentence by the Roman governor Pontius Pilate against Jesus." 136 Von Ammon of course had a sinister investment in the Gentile's non-judgment: it increases the Sanhedrin's guilt. 4. In his mid-century study, Der Prozess Jesu, Jozef Blinzler treats von Ammon's as a doctrinaire position. Introducing the problem of Pilate's judgment, Blinzler writes, "The evangelists do not explicitly say that Pilate pronounced a formal death sentence. Many researchers have concluded from this that his decision was not a verdict in the technical sense (kein Urteilsspruch im technischen Sinn)." 137 Agamben seems to half-recollect this passage of Der Prozess Jesu in one restatement of his own thesis. 138 "A trial . . . has taken place," Agamben concedes, but "there has not been any judgment in a technical sense (non vi è stato in senso tecnico alcun giudizio)." 139 5. T. A. Burkill can still insist in the pages of Novum Testamentum, in the late twentieth century, that "in none of the canonical gospels does Pontius Pilate expressly afrm that Jesus was guilty of making kingly pretensions or of any other crime. . . .
[H]e simply orders an execution." 140 My task in the remainder of this section is to discredit this twentieth-century critical thesis-only, however, as Agamben argues it in Pilate and Jesus. We can begin with Agamben's seemingly philological claim that there is no report of a Roman judgment in the gospels. "Judgment in Greek is krisis," he begins, before he then states that (α): "In the [trial] narrative of the evangelists the term does not appear." 141 In writing (α), Agamben overlooks Matthew 20:18 and Mark 10:33, where Jesus predicts that the Sanhedrin will judge him-using an expression from the Greek stem that (α) excludes. 142 More damaging is the fact that he takes no notice of several verses in the actual trial narratives of Matthew and Mark that state, in terms excluded by (α), that the Sanhedrin "judged" or "condemned" Jesus. 143 As it is written, then, (α) is false.
But Agamben does not want (α) to be taken as it is written, since he has no interest in the Sanhedrin trial. 144 What he means by "the trial of Jesus" is merely the Roman phase of Jesus's trial, or what German specialists call the Pilatus-Prozess. Consequently, what Agamben materially claims in (α) is that krisis-the Greek term for judgment-never appears in the gospels' Roman trial narratives. Of this Agamben is condent: "On the fact that a sentence was not pronounced [by Pilate], the narrative of the Gospels does not seem to leave any doubt." 145 Yet this also is false.
The Greek term for judgment is represented in the Roman trial narrative of Luke's gospel, in which we read that "Pilate gave sentence," 146 or "gave his verdict." 147 The Lukan verb here is epikrinein (to judge), 148 which the Vulgate renders with adiudicare (to judge). 149 In his rst gloss, Agamben tries to brush this off by writing that "the verb epikrinō. . . is never used in a trial-related sense." 150 But what does he mean by "never"? He cannot mean that epikrinein never has a forensic sense in Greek literature-since the term already features in a discussion of verdicts in Plato's Laws. 151 But neither can he mean that epikrinein never has a forensic sense in Judaic literaturesince the term announces a capital sentence in 2 Maccabees. 152 Nor nally can he mean that epikrinein never has a forensic sense in the New Testament-since the term is only used to signal the conclusion of Jesus's Roman trial. For epikrinein is in fact a hapax legomenon in the New Testament. 153 It only appears in Luke 23:24, 154 where it marks Pilate's judicial decree that Jesus should be crucied under the penal inscription: "This is the king of the Jews" (Luke 23:38).
In her ne monograph Pontius Pilate in History and Interpretation, Helen Bond catches the "technical nuance" of judgment in Luke's choice of epikrinein. This word shows Pilate in the act of issuing his capital sentence. 155 And this interpretation is put out of doubt by Luke 23:40, where one of the bandits crucied at Jesus's side says that he is dying "under the same sentence" as Jesus. 156 The Greek term rendered "sentence" here is krima, meaning judgment, and hence, judicial sentence. 157 Pilate's judgment of Jesus, which is issued in Luke 23:24, is unmistakably echoed by this bandit in Luke 23:40. Similarly, after Jesus's resurrection, one of his disciples laments that the Sanhedrin had "handed him over to be sentenced to death" (Luke 24:20). 158 The disciple's term here is again krima, which can again only refer to Pilate's judgment. 159 It is of course to Pilate's tribunal that the Sanhedrin conducts Jesus. 160 Our nding is thus that Luke not only reports a Roman sentence against Jesus, but three times references it: once during the Roman trial ( This question carries us forward, since Agamben persistently links (α) to a distinct, and, for our purposes, nal philological claim. As already quoted, Pilate "does not give a verdict" in Pilate and Jesus (α); instead, the Roman prefect "limits himself to 'handing over' Jesus" to be crucied (β). 161 While it is only Luke that defeats (α), all of the gospels appear to justify (β). They all state that Pilate "handed over" Jesus to be crucied.
The substance of (β) is Agamben's inference that this "handing over" is unconnected to Roman judgment. Unsurprisingly, this inference predates him in the critical literature by at least half a century. A Jesuit exegete, Joseph Bonsirven, concluded in 1952 that "Pilate did not pronounce a veritable sentence," on the grounds that in John 19:16, "we encounter the same word that is inscribed in the Synoptics: paredōken, 'he delivered up.'" 162 Bonsirven receives no mention in Pilate and Jesus.
But regardless of Agamben's sources, a complex New Testament thematic of "handing over" 163 that is merely touched on by (β) structures a transitional part of Agamben's exegetical grouping ( § §8-9) and the rst part of his theological grouping ( §10). Having stressed in other works the etymological link between tradition (tradere) and betrayal (tradire), 164 Agamben here exploits the same duplicity of the Greek verb paradidōmi: Judas "betrays" Jesus in Gethsemane; Jesus "yields up" his spirit in death; the apostles "hand down" doctrines to the churches, and so on. All of these conveyances derive from the Greek verb paradidōmi. Yet none of this concerns us, since the decisive formulation for our purposes is (β): Pilate "hands over" Jesus to be crucied.
As stated above, (β) is lexically sound. The evangelists all use paradidōmi to describe the moment when Pilate commits Jesus to a detachment of Roman troops-what Blinzler calls an Exekutionskommando 165 -to be put to death: Matthew 27:26: "So Pilate released Barabbas for them; and after ogging Jesus, he handed him over ( paredōken) to be crucied." Mark 15:15: "So Pilate, wishing to satisfy the crowd, released Barabbas for them; and after ogging Jesus, he handed him over ( paredōken) to be crucied." Luke 23:25: "He released the man they asked for, the one who had been put in prison for insurrection and murder [that is, Barabbas], and he handed over ( paredōken) Jesus as they wished." John 19:16: "Then Pilate handed over ( paredōken) Jesus to them to be crucied."
But if (β) is lexically correct, it is semantically incorrect. Or said differently: it is not the occurrence, but the sense of paradidōmi in Jesus's Roman trial that (β) misrepresents.
For Agamben implies with (α) that the language of "handing over" is detached from the machinery of judgment in the gospels. It is because of Pilate's non-judgment that he merely "hands over" Jesus, while this "handing over" is taken as evidence that Pilate has not sentenced Jesus. 166 The problem here is not only that Pilate sentences Jesus in Luke 23:24, immediately before he hands him over in Luke 23:25. The procedural logic of this is hard to miss: Pilate's "handing over" in verse 25 is consequent on his verdict in verse 24. It is no less of a problem that the Sanhedrin's "handing over" of Jesus is consequent on its own judgment, and pursuant of a Roman judgment. 167 We have already seen this in Luke 24:20, where the high-priestly court "handed Jesus over to be sentenced to death." What the Sanhedrin seeks, here, is a Roman "death sentence" (krima thanatou), and it is in order to obtain this sentence that they "hand Jesus over" ( paredōkan auton). Still, the most acute difculty for Agamben is that "handing over" itself comes to serve as a juridical formula in the gospels. Far from encoding Pilate's non-judgment, that is to say, the occurrence of paradidōmi in the gospels' trial accounts signals Pilate's judgment of Jesus.
It is necessary at this point to take distance from the trial narratives. For, long before Jesus is arrested by the Sanhedrin and handed over to Pontius Pilate, John the Baptist is seized by Herod Antipas. In the roughly parallel notices of John's arrest in Mark 1 and Matthew 4, the term used is paradidōmi. 168 In this way, the episode of John's arrest links the term paradidōmi to wrongful imprisonment and death in the rst chapters of the earliest gospels. 169 The term's formal link to judgment is made no later than Matthew 5 and a related segment of Luke 12.
Matthew 5:25: "Come to terms quickly with your accuser," says Jesus, "or your accuser may hand you over ( paradōi) to the judge, and the judge hand you over ( paradōi) to the guard, 170 and you will be thrown into prison."
Luke 12:58: "When you go with your accuser before a magistrate, on the way make an effort to settle the case, or you may be dragged before the judge, and the judge hand you over ( paradōsei) to the ofcer, and the ofcer throw you into prison."
In both sayings, it is given that when a judge (kritēs) "hands over" a prisoner it is a juridical act, and that when he "hands over" a prisoner for punishment it indicates a prior sentence. A rule of Bickerman's is apropos here: "We must decipher allusions to juridical facts which the sacred authors assumed their readers knew." 171 This is the situation with paradidōmi in the gospels. The term's juridical signicance is never stated in Matthew's gospel, for instance-yet without it, a parable in Matthew 18 cannot be interpreted. Here, Jesus likens the divine Father to a human master who at rst forgave a slave's debt and released him, but later summoned this slave and "handed him over ( paredōken) to be tortured until he would pay." 172 This parable's domestic court scenes simply assume the master's authority to judge his slaves. There is no reason for this authority, or this judgment, to be stated. Yet the parable ineluctably leads us to believe that this slave has been judged by his master, before being committed to the punishers, since his punishment is a type of the Last Judgment. 173 It is only Paul who explicitly juridicalizes the term paradidōmi in the New Testament. When he writes to the Corinthian believers that he has "judged" (kekrika) one of their number, Paul then instructs the church to "deliver" ( paradounai) the offender into the power of Satan, 174 which is to say, into "the world." 175 But if the juridical use of paradidōmi is most explicit in this apostolic verdict, it is still denite in the gospels. The late Dominican lexicographer Ceslas Spicq was sensitive to this. As Spicq documents, paradidōmi in Hellenistic papyri "often has the judicial meaning 'deliver to court or to prison.'" 176 He rightly observes that paradidōmi becomes "a technical term for Jesus's passion," and that in the gospels' trial narratives, it is "to be taken rst in its legal and judicial sense." 177 It is precisely this juridical sense that Agamben, without justication, denies paradidōmi. Contra Agamben's (β), then, the occurrence of paradidōmi before Jesus's crucixion is a signal, in all the gospels, of Pilate's judgment-not his non-judgment. The Sanhedrin "hands Jesus over" to Pilate after ruling that he should be "sentenced to death." 178 And Pilate "gives his verdict" before he "hands over" Jesus to be crucied. 179 In both cases, the 'handing over' of Jesus is consequent on the sentencing of Jesus. Therefore, with (β), Agamben has cited a procedural Greek term as proof of a procedural breach in Jesus's trial. This fails to convince. In the gospels, "handing over" implies no absence of judgment. On the contrary, paradidōmi is the language of courts, and the language of judgment.
excursus: lactantius and hugo grotius on pilate's judgment Agamben holds that "the traditional interpretation of Jesus' trial . . . must be revised" in light of Pilate and Jesus, 180 yet there is nothing new in his thesis that Pilate fails to pronounce a sentence. 181 On the contrary, this idea is archly traditional. Its twentieth-century bona des have already been sketched, but the idea of Pilate's non-judgment originated in antiquity, and it attracted controversy throughout the early modern period. 182 Hugo Grotius's fabulously learned-and barbarously neglected-Annotations on the New Testament contains a compelling treatment of the question of Pilate's judgment. 183 In this ninevolume philological commentary, which has never been translated from the Latin, the preeminent international lawyer of the seventeenth century-who produced a Senecan tragedy 184 of Jesus's trial and death, Christus Patiens, 185 a year before he published his epoch-making treatise on the law of the seas, 186 Mare Liberum-conclusively discredits the thesis of Pilate's non-judgment. And it is Grotius-not Agamben-who directs us to the Patristic text that long legitimized this thesis: Lactantius's Divine Institutes. 187 David Catchpole's statements, a decade later, are no less categorical: "Jesus was no Zealot, nor was he close to the Zealots. It is altogether in excess of the evidence to regard his movement and Zealotism as parallel or in sympathy with one another." In documentary terms, that is to say, "the 'political Jesus' theory is a failure." Catchpole, The Trial of Jesus: A Study in the Gospels and Jewish Historiography from 1770 to the Present Day, Studia Post-Biblica 18 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 126, 270. As Zealot's reception proves, however, the "political Jesus" theory is a lucrative failure. 182 I regret that time has not permitted me to track down a pair of extremely rare early modern tracts on Pilate's judgment:
seems mistakenly to detect in Luke 198 -we can conclude that the idea of Pilate's non-judgment is a Patristic one. This returns us to Grotius-who not only cites Lactantius's opinion, but collects countertestimonies in his gloss on Matthew 27:26. The pagan Acts of Pilate, 199 the Roman annalist Tacitus, 200 the Roman jurist Paulus, 201 and "Christ himself," 202 differently testify to the fact that Pilate judged Jesus. What is more, Grotius notes that the "ancient Christians"-in contrast to a relative latecomer such as Lactantius-accepted that Jesus died under a Roman sentence. 203 Grotius mines short passages from Ignatius in the second and Cyprian in the third century to support this claim. 204 (I would add to this short catalogue Augustine in the early fth century.) 205 In this way Grotius proves, in the space of a single gloss, that Lactantius's opinion-and, mutatis mutandis, Agamben's-is a dissenting, and relatively late, Patristic opinion.
But Grotius is most impressive as an exegete. His commentaries on the Synoptic gospels were completed by 1621, 206 and this can be taken as the date after which it became frivolous to uphold the Lactantian tradition.
